SOC-043
SOC-043 is a program with the supernatural ability to break into digital authentication systems, such as user accounts.
SOC-043 takes the form of two instances: SOC-043-A, which is currently in the possession of Stupid Objects archivists, and SOC-043-B, whose acquisition is ongoing. Both are created independently, but are related to each other and utilize the same anomalous unlocking mechanism.
There are no known special conditions needed to store SOC-043-A and SOC-043-B safely, but due to the incredible security risk they pose when used, it may not be borrowed without a very very good reason.
Discovery
SOC-043-A has been linked to several individual instances of unexplained user account breaches from 2008 to 202█, as discovered through IP address geolocation logs, device IDs, and warning emails from the affected accounts. However, Stupid Object Goons only became aware of SOC-043 in 2023 when an online video from 2018 resurfaced and went viral with obnoxious paranormal conspiracy commentary. This ain't about them.
The video appeared to show two siblings - the younger one ("Jayden") holding the camera, and the older one ("Elijah") holding a phone. The two approached a vending machine in what appears to be a school. The older sibling held their phone up to an "ePort" panel on a vending machine, which prompted the user to pay using Apple Pay. Both siblings took a moment to boo the Apple company before making a selection (a $2.00 USD bag of M&Ms). Then, the older sibling activated SOC-043-B on their phone, completed the prompt successfully, and vended the bag of M&Ms without paying, causing the younger sibling to cheer.
The viral resurgence of the video led to Elijah creating a ██████ account in order to respond to comments about the video, where they said they were capable of repeating the events and claimed to have done so in at least █ other incidents. Stupid Object Goons thought it was a hoax until increased media attention led to Elijah getting doxxed (wtf), allowing us to independently verify the incidents and find them to be anomalous. It was also around this time that we found out that Elijah was the one that hacked into Researcher ███████'s Millsberry.com account in 2008 by utilizing SOC-043-A. You fucking piece of shit asshole
On ██/██/202█, Elijah held a garage sale at their home in preparation to move out, including a laptop containing SOC-043-A which had become too slow to log into over the years. It was purchased by ████████ the same day, and through [DATA EXPUNGED], SOC-043-A was successfully acquired by the Goon Squad "PEPPAPICK", transferred onto a USB stick, and scrubbed from the original machine.
Acquisition of SOC-043-B is ongoing and assigned to the Goon Squad "PICKLEDPEPPA", though recent developments have made this task more difficult - see Incident 043-1. At this time, we do not believe Elijah to be "DEZELGDZ" (or a part of it, if it is a group of people,) but it is theorized that they had direct contact with DEZELGDZ when SCP-043-A was acquired.
Description
SOC-043-A is a 22 kilobyte executable (.exe) program currently stored on a USB drive "somewhere" in the Stupid Archives. SOC-043-A is a program capable of interfacing with other software on the host computer when run in Administrator mode in order to hijack its targets; see "Usage" below.
We don't know the size and contents of SCP-043-B, but we theorize it is an Android app in the .apk format. We know nothing about the source code, if it exists. SOC-043-B is stated to be incompatible with newer versions of Android, though the specific version range that will allow it to work are unknown. SOC-043-B is also capable of infiltrating targets besides user accounts, though we don't know if this is a form of extended capabilities compared to -A, or if -A is capable, albeit unwieldy, for doing the same thing.
Usage
When executed, SOC-043-A opens an interface on the host machine titled "DEZEL REPICKER" that auto-plays extremely loud electronic music. We don't know if the volume of it is at anomalous levels but it sure fucking seems like it. Luckily there is a little volume slider to turn it down. Yeesh...
The interface displays a shiny logo with green and brown "flame" effects that reads "DEZELGDZ", next to a stylized green drawing of a pig. Underneath the logo are three buttons: "Exit", "Pick", and "Info". Clicking "Exit" closes the window even though there is still an X at the top right, "Info" displays a (native OS-based) prompt explaining how to use the software, and "Pick" initiates the unlocking sequence. Below the buttons is an empty box with a scrollbar that will "log" messages created by the program, seemingly for troubleshooting purposes, but the program has yet to fail once (anomalous?) so I don't know what that is about.
It is unknown how SOC-043-B operates, but it appears to open a similar interface as SOC-043-B, designed in such a way to occupy a phone screen rather than a desktop computer. SOC-043-B also seems to be quieter than SOC-043-A, as no music was shown in the video, but it could be that the kid just muted their phone.
Both SOC-043-A and SOC-043-B initiate a lockpicking-themed "minigame". The user is prompted with a 2D illustration of a lock as well as two UI elements resembling a "lockpick" and a "tension tool" that are inserted into the lock. By aligning the "pick" correctly and turning the "tool", the user will instantly gain direct access to, or bypass, whatever system they are attempting to infiltrate. Otherwise, if the pick is aligned incorrectly, it may "break", failing the minigame.
The minigame in question lacks audio feedback, making it difficult to complete. Visual feedback is limited, only showing that if the pick is in the "wrong" position, the lock will not rotate further; there is no warning when the "pick" is about to "break".
This infiltration is effective 100% of the time; more "secure" passwords do not delay the process, and secondary security measures, such as security questions, two-factor authentication, or verification emails are unsent and bypassed completely. However, if the service notifies the account owner when activity is detected (such as via email), these messages are still sent. Even though the software can easily and instantly bypass these systems, testers have complained that more "secure" services are "harder to pick", which has not been conclusively researched.
Incident 043-1
On ██/██/202█, Researcher █████ initiated a private conversation with Elijah Nile to ask about SOC-043-B. Elijah was friendly, explaining that it was a port of SOC-043-A for Android phones. They also explained, at this time, that they had broken their phone containing SOC-043-B in 2020 and never got it repaired, but the device remains in their possession; upon transferring SOC-043-B to their new phone, it ceased to work due to the software being too old for newer Android versions. Elijah claimed at this time that they were willing to give the app to █████, but as Elijah was at work at the time, █████ would have to wait "until the weekend".
Four days later, on Saturday, █████ found that he had been blocked by Elijah without explanation.
The same day, another researcher, ███████ logged into the Stupid Objects portal to find a note sent to his account from Researcher Summers, sent at 1:50PM:
Hey ███████, I'm sorry but I think I am going to resign from the SOC-091 case and from Stupid Objects in general. This whole thing has been leaving a bad taste in my mouth. I know it's "research", but harassing children over literal Playdoh is fucked up. Please don't ask. I just want to be left alone.
Researcher Summers claimed to not write the message and was bewildered to find it in her message history. While the true sender of the message is inconclusive, at 8:37AM the same day, a "new session" notification was sent to Summers's SOC email logging an IP address from █████████, ██, the US state that Elijah currently resides in.
